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diff --git a/content/marx/economic-and-philosophic-manuscripts/_index.md b/content/marx/economic-and-philosophic-manuscripts/_index.md index 8290cb2..281dad5 100644 --- a/content/marx/economic-and-philosophic-manuscripts/_index.md +++ b/content/marx/economic-and-philosophic-manuscripts/_index.md @@ -617,7 +617,7 @@ Estranged labor turns thus: **(3)** *Man’s species-being,* both nature and his spiritual species-property, into a being *alien* to him, into a *means* of his *individual existence*. It estranges from man his own body, as well as external nature and his spiritual aspect, his *human* aspect. -**(4)** An immediate consequence of the fact that man is estranged from the product of his labor, from his life activity, from his species-being, is the *estrangement of man* from* man*. When man confronts himself, he confronts the *other* man. What applies to a man’s relation to his work, to the product of his labor and to himself, also holds of a man’s relation to the other man, and to the other man’s labor and object of labor. +**(4)** An immediate consequence of the fact that man is estranged from the product of his labor, from his life activity, from his species-being, is the *estrangement of man* from *man*. When man confronts himself, he confronts the *other* man. What applies to a man’s relation to his work, to the product of his labor and to himself, also holds of a man’s relation to the other man, and to the other man’s labor and object of labor. In fact, the proposition that man’s species-nature is estranged from him means that one man is estranged from the other, as each of them is from man’s essential nature. @@ -746,6 +746,122 @@ Splitting of labour into *labour itself* and the *wages of labour*. The worker *Clash of mutual contradictions*. +## Third Manuscript [^third28] + +### Private Property and Labour. Political Economy as a Product of the Movement of Private Property + +*||I2|* Re. p. XXXVI *[This refers to the missing part of the second manuscript. - Ed.]* The *subjective essence* of private property – *private property* as activity for itself [^third29], as *subject,* as *person* – is *labour*. It is therefore evident that only the political economy which acknowledged *labour* as its principle – *Adam Smith* – and which therefore no longer looked upon private property as a mere *condition* external to man – that it is this political economy which has to be regarded on the one hand as a product of the real *energy* and the real *movement* of private property (it is a movement of private property become independent for itself in consciousness – the modern industry as Self) – as a product of modern *industry* – and on the other hand, as a force which has quickened and glorified the energy and development of modern industry and made it a power in the realm of *consciousness.* + +To this enlightened political economy, which has discovered – within private property – the *subjective essence* of wealth, the adherents of the monetary and mercantile system, who look upon private property *only as an objective* substance confronting men, seem therefore to be *fetishists, Catholics. Engels* was therefore right to call *Adam Smith* the *Luther of Political Economy* [See [Outlines of a Critique of Political Economy](https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/df-jahrbucher/outlines.htm)]. Just as Luther recognised *religion* – *faith* – as the substance of the external *world* and in consequence stood opposed to Catholic paganism – just as he superseded *external* religiosity by making religiosity the *inner* substance of man – just as he negated the priests outside the layman because he transplanted the priest into laymen's hearts, just so with wealth: wealth as something outside man and independent of him, and therefore as something to be maintained and asserted only in an external fashion, is done away with; that is, this *external, mindless objectivity* of wealth is done away with, with private property being incorporated in man himself and with man himself being recognised as its essence. But as a result man is brought within the orbit of private property, just as with Luther he is brought within the orbit of religion. Under the semblance of recognising man, the political economy whose principle is labour rather carries to its logical conclusion the denial of man, since man himself no longer stands in an external relation of tension to the external substance of private property, but has himself become this tense essence of private property. What was previously *being external to oneself* – man's actual externalisation – has merely become the act of externalising – the process of alienating. This political economy begins by seeming to acknowledge man (his independence, spontaneity, etc.); then, locating private property in man's own being, it can no longer be conditioned by the local, national or other *characteristics of private property* as of *something existing outside itself*. This political economy, consequently, displays a *cosmopolitan*, universal energy which overthrows every restriction and bond so as to establish itself instead as the *sole* politics, the sole universality, the sole limit and sole bond. Hence it must throw aside this *hypocrisy* in the course of its further development and come *out in its complete cynicism*. And this it does – untroubled by all the apparent contradictions in which it becomes involved as a result of this theory – by developing the idea of *labour* much *more one-sidedly*, and therefore *more sharply* and *more consistently*, as the sole *essence of wealth;* by proving the implications of this theory to be *anti-human* in character, in contrast to the other, original approach. Finally, by dealing the death-blow to *rent* – that last, *individual, natural* mode of private property and source of wealth existing independently of the movement of labour, that expression of feudal property, an expression which has already become wholly economic in character and therefore incapable of resisting political economy. (The *Ricardo* school.) There is not merely a relative growth in the *cynicism* of political economy from Smith through Say to Ricardo, Mill, etc., inasmuch as the implications of *industry* appear more developed and more contradictory in the eyes of the last-named; these later economists also advance in a positive sense constantly and consciously further than their predecessors in their estrangement from man. They do so, however, *only* because their science develops more consistently and truthfully. Because they make private property in its active form the subject, thus simultaneously turning man into the essence – and at the same time turning man as non-essentiality into the essence – the contradiction of *||II|* reality corresponds completely to the contradictory being which they accept as their principle. Far from refuting it, the ruptured *world of industry* confirms their *self-ruptured* principle. Their principle is, after all, the principle of this rupture. + +The physiocratic doctrine of *Dr. Quesnay* forms the transition from the mercantile system to Adam Smith. *Physiocracy* represents directly the decomposition of feudal property in *economic* terms, but it therefore just as directly represents its *economic metamorphosis* and restoration, save that now its language is no longer feudal but economic. All wealth is resolved into *land* and *cultivation* (agriculture). Land is not yet *capital*: it is still a *special* mode of its existence, the validity of which is supposed to lie in, and to *derive from*, its natural peculiarity. Yet land is a general natural *element*, whilst the mercantile system admits the existence of wealth only in the form of *precious metal*. Thus the *object* of wealth – its matter – has straightway obtained the highest degree of universality within the *bounds of nature*, insofar as even as *nature*, it is immediate objective wealth. And land only exists for *man* through labour, through agriculture. + +Thus the subjective essence of wealth has already been transferred to labour. But at the same time agriculture is the *only productive* labour. Hence, labour is not yet grasped in its generality and abstraction: it is still bound to a particular *natural element as its matter*, and it is therefore only recognised in a *particular mode of existence determined by nature*. It is therefore still only a *specific, particular* alienation of man, just as its product is likewise conceived nearly [as] a specific form of wealth – due more to nature than to labour itself. The land is here still recognised as a phenomenon of nature independent of man – not yet as capital, i.e., as an aspect of labour itself. Labour appears, rather, as an aspect of the *land*. But since the fetishism of the old external wealth, of wealth existing only as an object, has been reduced to a very simple natural element, and since its essence – even if only partially and in a particular form – has been recognised within its subjective existence, the necessary step forward has been made in revealing the *general nature* of wealth and hence in the raising up of *labour* in its total absoluteness (i.e., its abstraction) as the *principle*. It is argued against physiocracy that *agriculture*, from the economic point of view – that is to say, from the only valid point of view – does not differ from any other industry; and that the *essence* of wealth, therefore, is not a *specific* form of labour bound to a particular element – a particular expression of labour – but *labour in general*. + +Physiocracy denies *particular*, external, merely objective wealth by declaring labour to be the *essence* of wealth. But for physiocracy labour is at first only the *subjective essence* of landed property. (It takes its departure from the type of property which historically appears as the dominant and acknowledged type.) It turns only landed property into *alienated man*. It annuls its feudal character by declaring *industry* (agriculture) as its *essence.* But it disavows the world of industry and acknowledges the feudal system by declaring *agriculture* to be the *only* industry. + +It is clear that if the *subjective essence* of industry is now grasped (of industry in opposition to landed property, i.e., of industry constituting itself as industry), this essence includes within itself its opposite. For just as industry incorporates annulled landed property, the *subjective* essence of industry at the same time incorporates the subjective essence of *landed property*. + +Just as landed property is the first form of private property, with industry at first confronting it historically merely as a special kind of property – or, rather, as landed property's liberated slave – so this process repeats itself in the scientific analysis of the *subjective* essence of private property, *labour*. Labour appears at first only as *agricultural labour*, but then asserts itself as *labour* in general. + +*||III|* All wealth has become *industrial* wealth, the *wealth* of *labour*, and *industry* is accomplished labour, just as the *factory system* is the perfected essence of *industry*, that is of labour, and just as *industrial capital* is the accomplished objective form of private property. + +We can now see how it is only at this point that private property can complete its dominion over man and become, in its most general form, a world-historical power. + +### Private Property and Communism + +Re. p. XXXIX. *[This refers to the missing part of the second manuscript. - Ed.]* The antithesis between *lack of property* and *property,* so long as it is not comprehended as the antithesis of *labour and capital,* still remains an indifferent antithesis, not grasped in its *active connection,* in its *internal* relation, not yet grasped as a *contradiction.* It can find expression in this *first* form even without the advanced development of private property (as in ancient Rome, Turkey, etc.). It does not yet *appear* as having been established by private property itself. But labour, the subjective essence of private property as exclusion of property, and capital, objective labour as exclusion of labour, constitute *private property* as its developed state of contradiction – hence a dynamic relationship driving towards resolution. + +*Re the same page*. The transcendence of self-estrangement follows the same course as self-estrangement. *Private property* is first considered only in its objective aspect – but nevertheless with labour as its essence. Its form of existence is therefore *capital,* which is to be annulled “as such” (Proudhon). Or a *particular form* of labour – labour levelled down, fragmented, and therefore unfree – is conceived as the source of private property’s *perniciousness* and of its existence in estrangement from men. For instance, *Fourier,* who, like the Physiocrats, also conceives *agricultural labour* to be at least the *exemplary* type, whereas *Saint-Simon* declares in contrast that *industrial labour* as such is the essence, and accordingly aspires to the *exclusive* rule of the industrialists and the improvement of the workers’ condition. Finally, *communism* is the *positive* expression of annulled private property – at first as *universal* private property. + +By embracing this relation as a *whole*, communism is: + +1. + In its first form only a *generalisation* and *consummation* of it [of this relation]. As such it appears in a two-fold form: on the one hand, the dominion of *material* property bulks so large that it wants to destroy *everything* which is not capable of being possessed by all as *private property*. It wants to disregard talent, etc., in an *arbitrary* manner. For it the sole purpose of life and existence is direct, physical *possession.* The category of the *worker* is not done away with, but extended to all men. The relationship of private property persists as the relationship of the community to the world of things. Finally, this movement of opposing universal private property to private property finds expression in the brutish form of opposing to *marriage* (certainly a *form of exclusive private property*) the *community of women,* in which a woman becomes a piece of *communal* and *common* property. It may be said that this idea of the *community of women gives away the secret* of this as yet completely crude and thoughtless communism.[^comm30] Just as woman passes from marriage to general prostitution, [Prostitution is only a *specific* expression of the *general* prostitution of the *labourer*, and since it is a relationship in which falls not the prostitute alone, but also the one who prostitutes – and the latter’s abomination is still greater – the capitalist, etc., also comes under this head. – *Note by Marx* [^comm31] so the entire world of wealth (that is, of man’s objective substance) passes from the relationship of exclusive marriage with the owner of private property to a state of universal prostitution with the community. This type of communism – since it negates the *personality* of man in every sphere – is but the logical expression of private property, which is this negation. General *envy* constituting itself as a power is the disguise in which *greed* re-establishes itself and satisfies itself, only in *another* way. The thought of every piece of private property as such is *at least* turned against *wealthier* private property in the form of envy and the urge to reduce things to a common level, so that this envy and urge even constitute the essence of competition. Crude communism *[the manuscript has: Kommunist. – Ed.]* is only the culmination of this envy and of this levelling-down proceeding from the *preconceived* minimum. It has a *definite, limited* standard. How little this annulment of private property is really an appropriation is in fact proved by the abstract negation of the entire world of culture and civilisation, the regression to the *unnatural* *||IV|* simplicity of the *poor* and crude man who has few needs and who has not only failed to go beyond private property, but has not yet even reached it. + + The community is only a community of *labour,* and equality of *wages* paid out by communal capital – by the *community* as the universal capitalist. Both sides of the relationship are raised to an *imagined* universality – *labour* as the category in which every person is placed, and *capital* as the acknowledged universality and power of the community. + + In the approach to *woman* as the *spoil* and hand-maid of communal lust is expressed the infinite degradation in which man exists for himself, for the secret of this approach has its *unambiguous*, decisive, *plain* and undisguised expression in the relation of *man* to *woman* and in the manner in which the *direct* and *natural* species-relationship is conceived. The direct, natural, and necessary relation of person to person is the *relation of man* to *woman.* In this *natural* species-relationship man’s relation to nature is immediately his relation to man, just as his relation to man is immediately his relation to nature – his own *natural* destination. In this relationship, therefore, is *sensuously manifested,* reduced to an observable *fact*, the extent to which the human essence has become nature to man, or to which nature to him has become the human essence of man. From this relationship one can therefore judge man’s whole level of development. From the character of this relationship follows how much *man* as a *species-being*, as *man*, has come to be himself and to comprehend himself; the relation of man to woman is the *most natural* relation of human being to human being. It therefore reveals the extent to which man’s *natural* behaviour has become *human,* or the extent to which the human essence in him has become a *natural* essence – the extent to which his *human nature* has come to be *natural* to him. This relationship also reveals the extent to which man’s *need* has become a *human* need; the extent to which, therefore, the *other* person as a person has become for him a need – the extent to which he in his individual existence is at the same time a social being. + + The first positive annulment of private property – *crude* communism – is thus merely a *manifestation* of the vileness of private property, which wants to set itself up as the *positive community system.* + +2. Communism (α) still political in nature – democratic or despotic; (β) with the abolition of the state, yet still incomplete, and being still affected by private property, i.e., by the estrangement of man. In both forms communism already is aware of being reintegration or return of man to himself, the transcendence of human self-estrangement; but since it has not yet grasped the positive essence of private property, and just as little the *human* nature of need, it remains captive to it and infected by it. It has, indeed, grasped its concept, but not its essence. + +3. + *Communism* as the *positive* transcendence of *private property* as *human self-estrangement,* and therefore as the real *appropriation* of the *human* essence by and for man; communism therefore as the complete return of man to himself as a *social* (i.e., human) being – a return accomplished consciously and embracing the entire wealth of previous development. This communism, as fully developed naturalism, equals humanism, and as fully developed humanism equals naturalism; it is the *genuine* resolution of the conflict between man and nature and between man and man – the true resolution of the strife between existence and essence, between objectification and self-confirmation, between freedom and necessity, between the individual and the species. Communism is the riddle of history solved, and it knows itself to be this solution. + + *||V|* The entire movement of history, just as its *[communism’s]* *actual* act of genesis – the birth act of its empirical existence – is, therefore, for its thinking consciousness the *comprehended* and *known* process of its *becoming*. Whereas the still immature communism seeks an *historical* proof for itself – a proof in the realm of what already exists – among disconnected historical phenomena opposed to private property, tearing single phases from the historical process and focusing attention on them as proofs of its historical pedigree (a hobby-horse ridden hard especially by Cabet, Villegardelle, etc.). By so doing it simply makes clear that by far the greater part of this process contradicts its own claim, and that, if it has ever existed, precisely its being in the *past* refutes its pretension to *reality.* + + It is easy to see that the entire revolutionary movement necessarily finds both its empirical and its theoretical basis in the movement of *private property* – more precisely, in that of the economy. + + This *material*, immediately *perceptible* private property is the material perceptible expression of *estranged human* life. Its movement – production and consumption – is the *perceptible* revelation of the movement of all production until now, i.e., the realisation or the reality of man. Religion, family, state, law, morality, science, art, etc., are only *particular* modes of production, and fall under its general law. The positive transcendence of *private property* as the appropriation of *human* life, is therefore the positive transcendence of all estrangement – that is to say, the return of man from religion, family, state, etc., to his *human*, i.e., *social,* existence. Religious estrangement as such occurs only in the realm of *consciousness,* of man’s inner life, but economic estrangement is that of *real life;* its transcendence therefore embraces both aspects. It is evident that the *initial* stage of the movement amongst the various peoples depends on whether the true *recognised* life of the people manifests itself more in consciousness or in the external world – is more ideal or real. Communism begins from the outset (*[Owen](https://marxists.org/glossary/people/o/w.htm#owen-robert)*) with atheism; but atheism is at first far from being *communism*; indeed, that atheism is still mostly an abstraction. + + The philanthropy of atheism is therefore at first only *philosophical,* abstract philanthropy, and that of communism is at once *real* and directly bent on *action.* + + We have seen how on the assumption of positively annulled private property man produces man – himself and the other man; how the object, being the direct manifestation of his individuality, is simultaneously his own existence for the other man, the existence of the other man, and that existence for him. Likewise, however, both the material of labour and man as the subject, are the point of departure as well as the result of the movement (and precisely in this fact, that they must constitute the *point of departure,* lies the historical *necessity* of private property). Thus the *social* character is the general character of the whole movement: *just as* society itself produces *man as man,* so is society *produced* by him. Activity and enjoyment, both in their content and in their *mode of existence*, are *social*: *social* activity and *social* enjoyment. The *human* aspect of nature exists only for *social* man; for only then does nature exist for him as a *bond* with man – as his existence for the other and the other’s existence for him – and as the life-element of human reality. Only then does nature exist as the *foundation* of his own *human* existence. Only here has what is to him his *natural* existence become his *human* existence, and nature become man for him. Thus *society* is the complete unity of man with nature – the true resurrection of nature – the consistent naturalism of man and the consistent humanism of nature. + + *||VI|* Social activity and social enjoyment exist by no means *only* in the form of some *directly* communal activity and directly *communal* enjoyment, although *communal* activity and *communal* enjoyment – i.e., activity and enjoyment which are manifested and affirmed in *actual direct association* with other men – will occur wherever such a *direct* expression of sociability stems from the true character of the activity’s content and is appropriate to the nature of the enjoyment. + + But also when I am active *scientifically,* etc. – an activity which I can seldom perform in direct community with others – then my activity is *social,* because I perform it as a *man*. Not only is the material of my activity given to me as a social product (as is even the language in which the thinker is active): my *own* existence *is* social activity, and therefore that which I make of myself, I make of myself for society and with the consciousness of myself as a social being. + + My *general* consciousness is only the *theoretical* shape of that of which the *living* shape is the *real* community, the social fabric, although at the present day *general* consciousness is an abstraction from real life and as such confronts it with hostility. The *activity* of my general consciousness, as an activity, is therefore also my *theoretical* existence as a social being. + + Above all we must avoid postulating “society” again as an abstraction vis-à-vis the individual. The individual *is the social being.* His manifestations of life – even if they may not appear in the direct form of *communal* manifestations of life carried out in association with others – are therefore an expression and confirmation of *social life.* Man’s individual and species-life are not *different,* however much – and this is inevitable – the mode of existence of the individual is a more *particular* or more *general* mode of the life of the species, or the life of the species is a more *particular* or more *general* individual life. + + In his *consciousness of species* man confirms his real *social life* and simply repeats his real existence in thought, just as conversely the being of the species confirms itself in species consciousness and exists for itself in its generality as a thinking being. + + Man, much as he may therefore be a *particular* individual (and it is precisely his particularity which makes him an individual, and a real *individual* social being), is just as much the *totality* – the ideal totality – the subjective existence of imagined and experienced society for itself; just as he exists also in the real world both as awareness and real enjoyment of social existence, and as a totality of human manifestation of life. + + Thinking and being are thus certainly *distinct,* but at the same time they are in unity with each other. + + *Death* seems to be a harsh victory of the species over the *particular* individual and to contradict their unity. But the particular individual is only a *particular species-being*, and as such mortal. + +4. + *[In the manuscript: "5". – Ed.]* Just as *private property* is only the perceptible expression of the fact that man becomes *objective* for himself and at the same time becomes to himself a strange and inhuman object; just as it expresses the fact that the manifestation of his life is the alienation of his life, that his realisation is his loss of reality, is an *alien* reality: so, the positive transcendence of private property – i.e., the *perceptible* appropriation for and by man of the human essence and of human life, of objective man, of human *achievements* should not be conceived merely in the sense of *immediate,* one-sided *enjoyment*, merely in the sense of *possessing*, of *having*. Man appropriates his comprehensive essence in a comprehensive manner, that is to say, as a whole man. Each of his *human* relations to the world – seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, feeling, thinking, observing, experiencing, wanting, acting, loving – in short, all the organs of his individual being, like those organs which are directly social in their form, *||VII|* are in their *objective* orientation, or in their *orientation to the object,* the appropriation of the object, the appropriation of *human* reality. Their orientation to the object is the *manifestation of the human reality,* [For this reason it is just as highly varied as the *determinations* of human *essence* and *activities*. – *Note by Marx*] it is human *activity* and human *suffering*, for suffering, humanly considered, is a kind of self-enjoyment of man. + + Private property has made us so stupid and one-sided that an object is only *ours* when we have it – when it exists for us as capital, or when it is directly possessed, eaten, drunk, worn, inhabited, etc., – in short, when it is *used* by us. Although private property itself again conceives all these direct realisations of possession only as *means of life,* and the life which they serve as means is the *life of private property* – labour and conversion into capital. + + In the place of *all* physical and mental senses there has therefore come the sheer estrangement of *all* these senses, the sense of *having.* The human being had to be reduced to this absolute poverty in order that he might yield his inner wealth to the outer world. [On the category of “*having*”, see *Hess* in the *Philosophy of the Deed*]. + + The abolition *[Aufhebung]* of private property is therefore the complete *emancipation* of all human senses and qualities, but it is this emancipation precisely because these senses and attributes have become, subjectively and objectively, *human*. The eye has become a *human* eye, just as its *object* has become a social, *human* object – an object made by man for man. The *senses* have therefore become directly in their practice *theoreticians.* They relate themselves to the thing for the sake of the thing, but the thing itself is an *objective human* relation to itself and to man, [In practice I can relate myself to a thing humanly only if the thing relates itself humanly to the human being. – *Note by Marx*] and vice versa. Need or enjoyment have consequently lost its *egotistical* nature, and nature has lost its mere *utility* by use becoming *human* use. + + In the same way, the senses and enjoyment of other men have become my *own* appropriation. Besides these direct organs, therefore, *social* organs develop in the *form* of society; thus, for instance, activity in direct association with others, etc., has become an organ for *expressing* my own *life,* and a mode of appropriating *human* life. + + It is obvious that the *human* eye enjoys things in a way different from the crude, non-human eye; the human *ear* different from the crude ear, etc. + + We have seen that man does not lose himself in his object only when the object becomes for him a *human* object or objective man. This is possible only when the object becomes for him a *social* object, he himself for himself a social being, just as society becomes a being for him in this object. + + On the one hand, therefore, it is only when the objective world becomes everywhere for man in society the world of man’s essential powers – human reality, and for that reason the reality of his *own* essential powers – that all *objects be*come for him the *objectification* of himself, become objects which confirm and realise *his* individuality, become his objects: that is, *man himself* becomes the object. The *manner* in which they become *his* depends on the *nature of the objects* and on the nature of the *essential power* corresponding to *it*; for it is precisely the *determinate nature* of this relationship which shapes the particular, *real* mode of affirmation. To the *eye* an object comes to be other than it is to the *ear,* and the object of the eye *is* another object than the object of the *ear.* The specific character of each essential power is precisely its *specific essence,* and therefore also the specific mode of its objectification, of its *objectively actual,* living *being*. Thus man is affirmed in the objective world not only in the act of thinking, *||VIII|* but with *all* his senses. + + On the other hand, let us look at this in its subjective aspect. Just as only music awakens in man the sense of music, and just as the most beautiful music has *no* sense for the unmusical ear – is [no] object for it, because my object can only be the confirmation of one of my essential powers – it can therefore only exist for me insofar as my essential power exists for itself as a subjective capacity; because the meaning of an object for me goes only so far as *my* sense goes (has only a meaning for a sense corresponding to that object) – for this reason the *senses* of the social man *differ* from those of the non-social man. Only through the objectively unfolded richness of man’s essential being is the richness of subjective *human* sensibility (a musical ear, an eye for beauty of form – in short, *senses* capable of human gratification, senses affirming themselves as essential powers of *man*) either cultivated or brought into being. For not only the five senses but also the so-called mental senses, the practical senses (will, love, etc.), in a word, *human* sense, the human nature of the senses, comes to be by virtue of *its* object, by virtue of *humanised* nature. The *forming* of the five senses is a labour of the entire history of the world down to the present. The *sense* caught up in crude practical need has only a *restricted* sense. For the starving man, it is not the human form of food that exists, but only its abstract existence as food. It could just as well be there in its crudest form, and it would be impossible to say wherein this feeding activity differs from that of *animals.* The care-burdened, poverty-stricken man has no *sense* for the finest play; the dealer in minerals sees only the commercial value but not the beauty and the specific character of the mineral: he has no mineralogical sense. Thus, the objectification of the human essence, both in its theoretical and practical aspects, is required to make man’s *sense human,* as well as to create the *human sense* corresponding to the entire wealth of human and natural substance. + + Just as through the movement of *private property*, of its wealth as well as its poverty – of its material and spiritual wealth and poverty – the budding society finds at hand all the material for this *development*, so *established* society produces man in this entire richness of his being produces the *rich* man *profoundly endowed with all the senses* – as its enduring reality. + + We see how subjectivity and objectivity, spirituality and materiality, activity *[Tätigkeit]* and suffering, lose their antithetical character, and – thus their existence as such antitheses only within the framework of society; <we see how the resolution of></we>*theoretical* antitheses is *only* possible in a *practical* way, by virtue of the practical energy of man. Their resolution is therefore by no means merely a problem of understanding, but a *real* problem of life, which *philosophy* could not solve precisely because it conceived this problem as *merely* a theoretical one. + + We see how the history of *industry* and the established *objective* existence of industry are the *open* book of *man’s essential powers,* the perceptibly existing human *psychology.* Hitherto this was not conceived in its connection with man’s *essential being,* but only in an external relation of utility, because, moving in the realm of estrangement, people could only think of man’s general mode of being – religion or history in its abstract-general character as politics, art, literature, etc. – *||IX|* as the reality of man’s essential powers and *man’s species-activity.* We have before us the *objectified essential powers* of man in the form of *sensuous, alien, useful objects,* in the form of estrangement, displayed in *ordinary material industry* (which can be conceived either as a part of that general movement, or that movement can be conceived as a *particular* part of industry, since all human activity hitherto has been labour – that is, industry – activity estranged from itself). + + A *psychology* for which this book, the part of history existing in the most perceptible and accessible form, remains a closed book, cannot become a genuine, comprehensive and *real* science. What indeed are we to think of a science which *airily* abstracts from this large part of human labour and which fails to feel its own incompleteness, while such a wealth of human endeavour, unfolded before it, means nothing more to it than, perhaps, what can be expressed in one word – “need”, “*vulgar need*”? + + The *natural sciences* have developed an enormous activity and have accumulated an ever-growing mass of material. Philosophy, however, has remained just as alien to them as they remain to philosophy. Their momentary unity was only a *chimerical illusion.* The will was there, but the power was lacking. Historiography itself pays regard to natural science only occasionally, as a factor of enlightenment, utility, and of some special great discoveries. But natural science has invaded and transformed human life all the more *practically* through the medium of industry; and has prepared human emancipation, although its immediate effect had to be the furthering of the dehumanisation of man. *Industry* is the *actual*, historical relationship of nature, and therefore of natural science, to man. If, therefore, industry is conceived as the *exoteric* revelation of man’s *essential powers,* we also gain an understanding of the human essence of nature or the natural essence of man. In consequence, natural science will lose its abstractly material – or rather, its idealistic – tendency, and will become the basis of *human* science, as it has already become – albeit in an estranged form – the basis of actual human life, and to assume *one* basis for life and a different basis for *science* is as a matter of course a lie. The nature which develops in human history the genesis of society is man's *real* nature; hence nature as it develops through industry, even though in an *estranged* form, is true *anthropological* nature. + + *Sense-perception* (see Feuerbach) must be the basis of all science. Only when it proceeds from sense-perception in the two-fold form of *sensuous* consciousness and *sensuous* need – is it *true* science. All history is the history of preparing and developing “man” to become the object of *sensuous* consciousness, and turning the requirements of “man as man” into his needs. History itself is a *real* part of *natural history* – of nature developing into man. Natural science will in time incorporate into itself the science of man, just as the science of man will incorporate into itself natural science: there will be *one* science. + + *||X|* *Man* is the immediate object of natural science; for immediate, *sensuous nature* for man is, immediately, human sensuousness (the expressions are identical) – presented immediately in the form of the *other* man sensuously present for him. Indeed, his own sense-perception first exists as human sensuousness for himself through the *other* man. But *nature* is the immediate object of the *science of man:* the first object of man – man – is nature, sensuousness; and the particular human sensuous essential powers can only find their self-understanding in the science of the natural world in general, just as they can find their objective realisation only in *natural* objects. The element of thought itself – the element of thought’s living expression – *language* – is of a sensuous nature. The *social* reality of nature, and *human* natural science, or the *natural science of man,* are identical terms. + + It will be seen how in place of the *wealth and poverty* of political economy come the *rich human being* and the rich *human* need. The *rich* human being is simultaneously the human being *in need of* a totality of human manifestations of life – the man in whom his own realisation exists as an inner necessity, as *need.* Not only *wealth,* but likewise the *poverty* of man – under the assumption of socialism[^comm32] – receives in equal measure a human and therefore social significance. Poverty is the passive bond which causes the human being to experience the need of the greatest wealth – the *other* human being. The dominion of the objective being in me, the sensuous outburst of my life activity, is *passion,* which thus becomes here the *activity* of my being. + +5. + A *being* only considers himself independent when he stands on his own feet; and he only stands on his own feet when he owes his *existence* to himself. A man who lives by the grace of another regards himself as a dependent being. But I live completely by the grace of another if I owe him not only the maintenance of my life, but if he has, moreover, *created* my *life* – if he is the *source* of my life. When it is not of my own creation, my life has necessarily a source of this kind outside of it. The *Creation* is therefore an idea very difficult to dislodge from popular consciousness. The fact that nature and man exist on their own account is in*comprehensible* to it, because it contradicts everything *tangible* in practical life. + + The creation of the *earth* has received a mighty blow from *geognosy* – i.e., from the science which presents the formation of the earth, the development of the earth, as a process, as a self-generation. *Generatio aequivoca* is the only practical refutation of the theory of creation.[^comm33] + + Now it is certainly easy to say to the single individual what Aristotle has already said: You have been begotten by your father and your mother; therefore in you the mating of two human beings – a species-act of human beings – has produced the human being. You see, therefore, that even physically man owes his existence to man. Therefore you must not only keep sight of the *one* aspect – the *infinite* progression which leads you further to inquire: Who begot my father? Who his grandfather? etc. You must also hold on to the *circular movement* sensuously perceptible in that progress by which man repeats himself in procreation, *man* thus always remaining the subject. You will reply, however: I grant you this circular movement; now grant me the progress which drives me ever further until I ask: Who begot the first man, and nature as a whole? I can only answer you: Your question is itself a product of abstraction. Ask yourself how you arrived at that question. Ask yourself whether your question is not posed from a standpoint to which I cannot reply, because it is wrongly put. Ask yourself whether that progress as such exists for a reasonable mind. When you ask about the creation of nature and man, you are abstracting, in so doing, from man and nature. You postulate them as *non-existent,* and yet you want me to prove them to you as *existing.* Now I say to you: Give up your abstraction and you will also give up your question. Or if you want to hold on to your abstraction, then be consistent, and if you think of man and nature as *non-existent,* *||XI|* then think of yourself as non-existent, for you too are surely nature and man. Don’t think, don’t ask me, for as soon as you think and ask, your *abstraction* from the existence of nature and man has no meaning. Or are you such an egotist that you conceive everything as nothing, and yet want yourself to exist? + + You can reply: I do not want to postulate the nothingness of nature, etc. I ask you about its *genesis,* just as I ask the anatomist about the formation of bones, etc. + + But since for the socialist man the *entire so-called history of the world* is nothing but the creation of man through human labour, nothing but the emergence of nature for man, so he has the visible, irrefutable proof of his *birth* through himself, of his *genesis.* Since the *real existence* of man and nature has become evident in practice, through sense experience, because man has thus become evident for man as the being of nature, and nature for man as the being of man, the question about an *alien* being, about a being above nature and man – a question which implies the admission of the unreality of nature and of man – has become impossible in practice. *[Atheism](https://marxists.org/glossary/terms/a/t.htm#atheism)*, as the denial of this unreality, has no longer any meaning, for atheism is a *negation of God,* and postulates *the existence of man* through this negation; but socialism as socialism no longer stands in any need of such a mediation. It proceeds from the *theoretically and practically sensuous consciousness* of man and of nature as the *essence.* Socialism is man’s *positive self-consciousness,* no longer mediated through the abolition of religion, just as *real life* is man’s positive reality, no longer mediated through the abolition of private property, through *communism*. Communism is the position as the negation of the negation, and is hence the *actual* phase necessary for the next stage of historical development in the process of human emancipation and rehabilitation. *Communism* is the necessary form and the dynamic principle of the immediate future, but communism as such is not the goal of human development, the form of human society. *|XI||*[^comm34] + [^preface1]: @@ -790,7 +906,7 @@ Splitting of labour into *labour itself* and the *wages of labour*. The worker [^capital12]: The preceding page (VII) of the first manuscript does not contain any text relating to the sections “Profit of Capital” and “Rent of Land” (see Note 1). -[^capital13]: The whole paragraph, including the quotation from Ricardo’s book in the French translation by Francisco Solano Constancio:* Des principes de l’economie politique, et de 1’impôt, *2-e éd., Paris, 1835, T. II, pp. 194-95 (see the corresponding English edition* On the Principles of Political Economy, and Taxation, *London, 1817), and from Sismondi’s* Nouveaux principes d’économie politique...*, Paris, 1819, T. II., p. 331, is an excerpt from Eugéne Buret’s book *De la misère des classes laborieuses en Angleterre et en France*.... Paris, 1840, T. I, pp. 6-7, note. +[^capital13]: The whole paragraph, including the quotation from Ricardo’s book in the French translation by Francisco Solano Constancio: *Des principes de l’economie politique, et de 1’impôt,* 2-e éd., Paris, 1835, T. II, pp. 194-95 (see the corresponding English edition *On the Principles of Political Economy, and Taxation,* London, 1817), and from Sismondi’s *Nouveaux principes d’économie politique...*, Paris, 1819, T. II., p. 331, is an excerpt from Eugéne Buret’s book *De la misère des classes laborieuses en Angleterre et en France*.... Paris, 1840, T. I, pp. 6-7, note. [^capital14]: The allusion is to the following passage: “In a perfectly fair lottery, those who draw the prizes ought to gain all that is lost by those who draw the blanks. In a profession where twenty fail for one that succeeds, that one ought to gain all that should have been gained by the unsuccessful twenty.” (Smith, *Wealth of Nations,* Vol. 1, Bk. 1, p. 94.) @@ -825,26 +941,19 @@ Splitting of labour into *labour itself* and the *wages of labour*. The worker [^second27]: This refers to Georg Ludwig Wilhelm Funke, *Die aus der unbeschrdnklen Theilbarkeit des Grundeigenthums hervorgehenden Nachtheile, Hamburg und Gotha*, 1839, p. 56, in which there is a reference to Heinrich Leo, *Studien und Skizzen zu einer Vaturlehre des Slaates,* Halle, 1833, p. 102. -<!-- class: fst --> -<span class="term">28.</span> The third manuscript is a thick notebook the last few pages of which are blank. The pages are divided into two columns by a vertical line, not for the purpose of dividing the text according to the headings but for purely technical reasons. The text of the first three sections comprises pp. I-XI, XIV-XXI, XXXIV-XXXVIII and was written as a supplement to the missing pages of the second manuscript. Pages XI-XIII, XVII, XVIII, XXIII, XXIV, XXVI, XXXIV contain the text of the concluding chapter dealing with the criticism of Hegel’s dialectic (on some pages it is written alongside the text of other sections). In some places the manuscript contains the author’s remarks testifying to his intention to unite into a single whole various passages of this section separated from each other by the text of other sections. Pages XXIX-XL comprise the draft Preface. Finally, the text on the last pages (XLI-XLIII) is a self-contained essay on the power of money in bourgeois society. +[^third28]: The third manuscript is a thick notebook the last few pages of which are blank. The pages are divided into two columns by a vertical line, not for the purpose of dividing the text according to the headings but for purely technical reasons. The text of the first three sections comprises pp. I-XI, XIV-XXI, XXXIV-XXXVIII and was written as a supplement to the missing pages of the second manuscript. Pages XI-XIII, XVII, XVIII, XXIII, XXIV, XXVI, XXXIV contain the text of the concluding chapter dealing with the criticism of Hegel’s dialectic (on some pages it is written alongside the text of other sections). In some places the manuscript contains the author’s remarks testifying to his intention to unite into a single whole various passages of this section separated from each other by the text of other sections. Pages XXIX-XL comprise the draft Preface. Finally, the text on the last pages (XLI-XLIII) is a self-contained essay on the power of money in bourgeois society. -<!-- class: fst --> -<span class="term">29.</span> The manuscript has “als für sich seiende Tätigkeit.” For the meaning of the terms “für sich” and “an sich” in Hegel’s philosophy see Note 25. +[^third29]: The manuscript has “als für sich seiende Tätigkeit.” For the meaning of the terms “für sich” and “an sich” in Hegel’s philosophy see Note 25. -<!-- class: fst --> -<span class="term">30.</span> Marx refers to the rise of the primitive, crude equalitarian tendencies among the representatives of utopian communism at the early stages of its development. Among the medieval religious communistic communities, in particular, there was current a notion of the common possession of women as a feature of the future society depicted in the spirit of consumer communism ideals. In 1534-35 the German Anabaptists, who seized power in Münster, tried to introduce polygamy in accordance with this view. Tommaso Campanella, the author of *Civitas Solis* (early 17th century), rejected monogamy in his ideal society. The primitive communistic communities were also characterised by asceticism and a hostile attitude to science and works of art. Some of these primitive equalitarian features, the negative attitude to the arts in particular, were inherited by the communist trends of the first half of the 19th century, for example, by the members of the French secret societies of the 1830s and 1840s (“worker-egalitarians,” “humanitarians,” and so on) comprising the followers of Babeuf (for a characterisation of these see Engels, “Progress of Social Reform on the Continent” (Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Collected Works,* Volume 3, pp. 396-97)). +[^comm30]: Marx refers to the rise of the primitive, crude equalitarian tendencies among the representatives of utopian communism at the early stages of its development. Among the medieval religious communistic communities, in particular, there was current a notion of the common possession of women as a feature of the future society depicted in the spirit of consumer communism ideals. In 1534-35 the German Anabaptists, who seized power in Münster, tried to introduce polygamy in accordance with this view. Tommaso Campanella, the author of *Civitas Solis* (early 17th century), rejected monogamy in his ideal society. The primitive communistic communities were also characterised by asceticism and a hostile attitude to science and works of art. Some of these primitive equalitarian features, the negative attitude to the arts in particular, were inherited by the communist trends of the first half of the 19th century, for example, by the members of the French secret societies of the 1830s and 1840s (“worker-egalitarians,” “humanitarians,” and so on) comprising the followers of Babeuf (for a characterisation of these see Engels, “Progress of Social Reform on the Continent” (Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Collected Works,* Volume 3, pp. 396-97)). -<!-- class: fst --> -<span class="term">31.</span> This note is given by Marx on page V of the manuscript where it is separated by a horizontal line from the main text, but according to its meaning it refers to this sentence. +[^comm31]: This note is given by Marx on page V of the manuscript where it is separated by a horizontal line from the main text, but according to its meaning it refers to this sentence. -<!-- class: fst --> -<span class="term">32.</span> This part of the manuscript shows clearly the peculiarity of the terminology used by Marx in his works. At the time he had not worked out terms adequately expressing the conceptions of scientific communism he was then evolving and was still under the influence of Feuerbach in that respect. Hence the difference in the use of words in his early and subsequent, mature writings. In the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* the word “socialism” is used to denote the stage of society at which it has carried out a revolutionary transformation, abolished private property, class antagonisms, alienation and so on. In the same sense Marx used the expression “communism equals humanism.” At that time he understood the term “communism as such” not as the final goal of revolutionary transformation but as the process of this transformation, development leading up to that goal, a lower stage of the process. +[^comm32]: This part of the manuscript shows clearly the peculiarity of the terminology used by Marx in his works. At the time he had not worked out terms adequately expressing the conceptions of scientific communism he was then evolving and was still under the influence of Feuerbach in that respect. Hence the difference in the use of words in his early and subsequent, mature writings. In the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* the word “socialism” is used to denote the stage of society at which it has carried out a revolutionary transformation, abolished private property, class antagonisms, alienation and so on. In the same sense Marx used the expression “communism equals humanism.” At that time he understood the term “communism as such” not as the final goal of revolutionary transformation but as the process of this transformation, development leading up to that goal, a lower stage of the process. -<!-- class: fst --> -<span class="term">33.</span> This expression apparently refers to the theory of the English geologist Sir Charles Lyell who, in his three-volume work *The Principles of Geology* (1830-33), proved the evolution of the earth’s crust and refuted the popular theory of cataclysms. Lyell used the term “historical geology” for his theory. The term “geognosy” was introduced by the 18th-century German scientist Abraham Werner, a specialist in mineralogy, and it was used also by Alexander Humboldt. +[^comm33]: This expression apparently refers to the theory of the English geologist Sir Charles Lyell who, in his three-volume work *The Principles of Geology* (1830-33), proved the evolution of the earth’s crust and refuted the popular theory of cataclysms. Lyell used the term “historical geology” for his theory. The term “geognosy” was introduced by the 18th-century German scientist Abraham Werner, a specialist in mineralogy, and it was used also by Alexander Humboldt. -<!-- class: fst --> -<span class="term">34.</span> This statement is interpreted differently by researchers. Many of them maintain that Marx here meant crude equalitarian communism, such as that propounded by Babeuf and his followers. While recognising the historic role of that communism, he thought it impossible to ignore its weak points. It seems more justifiable, however, to interpret this passage proceeding from the peculiarity of terms used in the manuscript (see Note 32). Marx here used the term “communism” to mean not the higher phase of classless society (which he at the time denoted as “socialism” or “communism equalling humanism”) but movement (in various forms, including primitive forms of equalitarian communism at the early stage) directed at its achievement, a revolutionary transformation process of transition to it. Marx emphasised that this process should not be considered as an end in itself, but that it is a necessary, though a transitional, stage in attaining the future social system, which will be characterised by new features distinct from those proper to this stage. +[^comm34]: This statement is interpreted differently by researchers. Many of them maintain that Marx here meant crude equalitarian communism, such as that propounded by Babeuf and his followers. While recognising the historic role of that communism, he thought it impossible to ignore its weak points. It seems more justifiable, however, to interpret this passage proceeding from the peculiarity of terms used in the manuscript (see Note 32). Marx here used the term “communism” to mean not the higher phase of classless society (which he at the time denoted as “socialism” or “communism equalling humanism”) but movement (in various forms, including primitive forms of equalitarian communism at the early stage) directed at its achievement, a revolutionary transformation process of transition to it. Marx emphasised that this process should not be considered as an end in itself, but that it is a necessary, though a transitional, stage in attaining the future social system, which will be characterised by new features distinct from those proper to this stage. <!-- class: fst --> <span class="term">35.</span> Page XI (in part) and pages XII and XIII are taken up by a text relating to the concluding chapter (see Note 28). |