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@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ Then: *The externality of this abstract thinking* ... *nature,* as it is for thi
 
 There is a double error in Hegel.
 
-The <b>first</b> emerges most clearly in the *Phänomenologie*, the birth-place of the Hegelian philosophy. When, for instance, wealth, state-power, etc., are understood by Hegel as entities estranged from the *human* being, this only happens in their form as thoughts ... They are thought-entities, and therefore merely an estrangement of *pure*, i.e., abstract, philosophical thinking. The whole process therefore ends with absolute knowledge. It is precisely abstract thought from which these objects are estranged and which they confront with their presumption of reality. The *philosopher* – who is himself an abstract form of estranged man – takes himself as the *criterion *of the estranged world. The whole *history of the alienation process* [*Ent�u�erungsgeschichte*] and the whole *process of the retraction *of the alienation is therefore nothing but the *history of the production *of abstract (i.e., absolute) *||XVII|*[^hegelootnote.htm#fn45] thought – of logical, speculative thought. The *estrangement*, [*Entfremdung*] which therefore forms the real interest of the transcendence [*Aufhebung*] of this alienation [*Ent�u�erung*], is the opposition of *in itself* and *for itself*, of *consciousness and self-consciousness*, of *object and subject* – that is to say, it is the opposition between abstract thinking and sensuous reality or real sensuousness within thought itself. All other oppositions and movements of these oppositions are but the *semblance*, the *cloak*, the *exoteric* shape of these oppositions which alone matter, and which constitute the *meaning *of these other, profane oppositions. It is not the fact that the human being *objectifies himself inhumanly*, in opposition to himself, but the fact that he *objectifies himself* [*selbst sich vergegenst�ndlicht*] in *distinction* from and in *opposition* to abstract thinking, that constitutes the posited essence of the estrangement [*Entfremdung*] and the thing to be superseded [*aufzuhebende*].
+The <b>first</b> emerges most clearly in the *Phänomenologie*, the birth-place of the Hegelian philosophy. When, for instance, wealth, state-power, etc., are understood by Hegel as entities estranged from the *human* being, this only happens in their form as thoughts ... They are thought-entities, and therefore merely an estrangement of *pure*, i.e., abstract, philosophical thinking. The whole process therefore ends with absolute knowledge. It is precisely abstract thought from which these objects are estranged and which they confront with their presumption of reality. The *philosopher* – who is himself an abstract form of estranged man – takes himself as the *criterion *of the estranged world. The whole *history of the alienation process* [*Entäußerungsgeschichte*] and the whole *process of the retraction *of the alienation is therefore nothing but the *history of the production *of abstract (i.e., absolute) *||XVII|*[^hegelootnote.htm#fn45] thought – of logical, speculative thought. The *estrangement*, [*Entfremdung*] which therefore forms the real interest of the transcendence [*Aufhebung*] of this alienation [*Entäußerung*], is the opposition of *in itself* and *for itself*, of *consciousness and self-consciousness*, of *object and subject* – that is to say, it is the opposition between abstract thinking and sensuous reality or real sensuousness within thought itself. All other oppositions and movements of these oppositions are but the *semblance*, the *cloak*, the *exoteric* shape of these oppositions which alone matter, and which constitute the *meaning *of these other, profane oppositions. It is not the fact that the human being *objectifies himself inhumanly*, in opposition to himself, but the fact that he *objectifies himself* [*selbst sich vergegenständlicht*] in *distinction* from and in *opposition* to abstract thinking, that constitutes the posited essence of the estrangement [*Entfremdung*] and the thing to be superseded [*aufzuhebende*].
 
 *||XVIII|* The appropriation of man’s essential powers, which have become objects – indeed, alien objects – is thus in the *first place* only an *appropriation* occurring in *consciousness*, in *pure thought, *i.e., in *abstraction: *it is the appropriation of these objects as *thoughts *and as *movements of thought*. Consequently, despite its thoroughly negative and critical appearance and despite the genuine criticism contained in it, which often anticipates far later development, there is already latent in the *Phänomenologie *as a germ, a potentiality, a secret, the uncritical positivism and the equally uncritical idealism of Hegel’s later works – that philosophic dissolution and restoration of the existing empirical world.
 
@@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ Man as an objective, sensuous being is therefore a *suffering* being – and bec
 Thirdly, because this positing of thinghood is itself only an illusion, an act contradicting the nature of pure activity, it has to be cancelled again and thinghood denied.
 
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-*Re 3, 4, 5 and 6*. (3) This externalisation [*Ent�u�erung*] of consciousness has not merely a *negative* but a *positive* significance, and (4) it has this meaning not merely *for us *or intrinsically, but for consciousness itself.     *For consciousness *the negative of the object, its annulling of itself, has *positive *significance – i.e., consciousness *knows* this nullity of the object – because it alienates *itself; *for, in this alienation it *knows *itself as object, or, for the sake of the indivisible unity of *being-for-itself,* the object as itself.    (6) On the other hand, there is also this other moment in the process, that consciousness has also just as much superseded this alienation and objectivity and resumed them into itself, being thus *at home *in its *other-being* *as such.*
+*Re 3, 4, 5 and 6*. (3) This externalisation [*Entäußerung*] of consciousness has not merely a *negative* but a *positive* significance, and (4) it has this meaning not merely *for us *or intrinsically, but for consciousness itself.     *For consciousness *the negative of the object, its annulling of itself, has *positive *significance – i.e., consciousness *knows* this nullity of the object – because it alienates *itself; *for, in this alienation it *knows *itself as object, or, for the sake of the indivisible unity of *being-for-itself,* the object as itself.    (6) On the other hand, there is also this other moment in the process, that consciousness has also just as much superseded this alienation and objectivity and resumed them into itself, being thus *at home *in its *other-being* *as such.*
 
 As we have already seen, the appropriation of what is estranged and objective, or the annulling of objectivity in the form of *estrangement *(which has to advance from indifferent strangeness to real, antagonistic estrangement), means likewise or even primarily for Hegel that it is *objectivity* which is to be annulled, because it is not the *determinate* character of the object, but rather its *objective *character that is offensive and constitutes estrangement for self-consciousness. The object is therefore something negative, self-annulling – a *nullity*. This nullity of the object has not only a negative but a *positive *meaning for consciousness, since this nullity of the object is precisely the *self-confirmation *of the non-objectivity, of the *||XXVIII|* *abstraction *of itself. For *consciousness itself *the nullity of the object has a positive meaning because it *knows *this nullity, the objective being, as *its self-alienation; *because it knows that it exists only as a result of its own self-alienation....